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The emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases are now more than ever considered threats to public
health systems. There have been over 20 outbreaks of Ebola in the past 40 years. Only recently, the World
Health Organization has declared a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) in West
Africa, with a projected estimate of 1.2 million deaths expected in the next 6 months. Ebola virus is a highly
virulent pathogen, often fatal in humans and non-human primates. Ebola is now a great priority for global
health security and often becomes fatal if left untreated. This study employed a narrative review. Three major
databases  MEDLINE, EMBASE, and Global Health  were searched using both ‘text-words’ and
‘thesaurus terms’. Evidence shows that low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are not coping well with
the current challenges of Ebola, not only because they have poor and fragile systems but also because there
are poor infectious disease surveillance and response systems in place. The identification of potential cases is
problematic, particularly in the aspects of contact tracing, infection control, and prevention, prior to the
diagnosis of the case. This review therefore aims to examine whether LMICs’ health systems would be able to
control and manage Ebola in future and identifies two key elements of health systems strengthening that are
needed to ensure the robustness of the health system to respond effectively.
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T
he emergence and re-emergence of infectious, zoono-
tic, high-risk diseases are now more than ever con-
sidered threats to public health systems (13). The
most profound consequences of the recent outbreak of
Ebola virus disease (EVD) were felt in Western Africa due
to the failure of today’s health governance (4). Rid and
Emanuel (5) argue that global response mechanisms were
relatively poor as a consequence of poor infrastructure,
fragmented health systems, and inadequate experimental
treatments. This paper addresses an overarching research
question: What have been the weaknesses of primary
healthcare systems in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs), and how might they be strengthened to ensure
better control and prevention of Ebola outbreaks in future?
Methods
This study utilised a narrative review of the papers focus-
ing on EVD and health systems in relation to control and
prevention in the primary healthcare context. Petticrew
and Roberts (6, p. 39) argued that narrative review refers
to ‘a systematic review that synthesises the individual
studies narratively’ (rather than by means of a meta-
analysis). This involves systematically extracting, checking,
and narratively summarising information on their meth-
ods and results relating to a specific research question
to provide ‘informative and evidence-based’ answers. The
Institute of Medicine (7, p. 82), however, alerts the narra-
tive reviewer to the danger of incorrect conclusions, and
ultimately wrong decisions or recommendations if they
‘fail to acknowledge or address the risk of reporting biases,
neglect to appraise the quality of individual studies in-
cluded in the review, and (they) are subject to errors during
the data extraction and analysis’.
Three major electronic databases (MEDLINE, EM-
BASE, and Global Health) were searched using both ‘text-
words’ and ‘thesaurus terms’, focusing on Ebola and
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health systems in LMICs. These databases were considered
the best known, having international coverage of over
80 countries and about 15,000 journals indexed, alongside
their vast resources capturing the fields of medicine, inter-
national health, and related disciplines.
The disease
Ebola virus is a highly virulent pathogen. It is an RNA virus
and member of the filovirus family, one of four families of
viruses which can cause viral haemorrhagic fever, a severe
multisystem syndrome which is often fatal in humans and
non-human primates. The incubation period varies between
1 and 21 days; however, patients are not considered in-
fectious until they develop symptoms (8). During outbreaks,
the risk of person-to-person transmission through con-
tact with body fluids from infected patients is very high,
particularly during the late stage of the disease (9) and
touching cadavers has been shown to be a significant risk
factor associated with developing EVD (1012). Indeed, in
Guinea, during the 2014 EVD outbreak, 60% of cases were
found to be linked to traditional burials (13).
Despite the severity of the symptoms, a 56% survival
rate may be seen in the present outbreak, but considerably
higher rates have been seen in previous outbreaks; for
example, in Uganda, the case fatality rate for Bundibugyo
strain infections was only 25% and in Europe it was only
22%, mainly due to proper intensive care with appropriate
supportive therapy (1416).
There have been over 20 outbreaks of EVD in the
past 40 years in Africa, including Zaire in 1976, Sudan in
1976, Congo (DRC) in 1995, Uganda in 20002001, and
Congo (ROC) in 2003. These have shown the importance
of preparedness to deal with the situation (17, 18) in
order to minimise human loss. In 2014, the outbreak
of EVD in West Africa was declared as a public health
emergency of international concern (PHEIC) by the World
Health Organization (WHO), with a projected estimate
of 1.2 million deaths (19, 20). As of 13 September 2015,
there have been 28,220 reported confirmed, probable,
and suspected cases of EVD (21). EVD, by nature, mostly
affects economically deprived/poor countries where there
is limited capacity to respond to the incidences of disease.
This in turn impacts negatively on national infrastructure
and disease management (22). Though there is some evi-
dence of controlling and managing infectious disease
using appropriate means, the controlling of diseases or
infection using health systems intelligence is patchy.
Problem analysis
Zoonoses are defined as infectious diseases that are natu-
rally transmitted between wild or domesticated vertebrate
animals and humans (23, 24). More than 60% of human
infections arise from zoonotic pathogens; they are respon-
sible for billions of cases of human disease and millions
of deaths annually and are considered to represent an
increasing threat to global health (24). Although many
zoonotic infections are stably established (enzootic) in
animal populations and transmit from animals to people
with little or no subsequent person-to-person transmission,
some such as Ebola virus can spread efficiently within the
human population leading to localised outbreaks (24).
Statistics reveal that children and mothers who are poor
and marginalised are particularly vulnerable to this dis-
ease (25), especially in developing nations where health
and environment systems are fragile, fragmented, and
non-responsive in meeting people’s healthcare needs. It
has been argued that the lack of strong public healthcare
delivery systems has been a key factor in the failure to halt
the development of the disease (26). Community ignor-
ance due to poor education and knowledge, and ineffective
primary care systems at the local levels, are likely to lead to
the development of myths, stigma, and anxiety associated
with EVD and its mode of transmission, constraining ado-
ption of methods of protection and personal hygiene prac-
tices (27). Osungbade and Oni (28) claim that the control
measures for EVD were undermined by several factors:
lack of a clinically proven vaccine and virus-specific treat-
ment, weak health systems including poor environment,
and traditional socio-cultural beliefs and practices. Fur-
thermore, healthcare professionals are not appropriately
trained in how to manage cases during an outbreak situ-
ation, and the resources needed to prevent the spread of
disease are unavailable (2). Demographic changes, chan-
ging human behaviour, political violence in civil war and
ethnic conflicts, ignorance, and poor health infrastructure
are considered as key determinants for exacerbating these
problems (3, 29). These attributes would certainly create
some challenges in disease identification, notification,
and characterisation, as well as undermining collaborative
endeavours for the access to and provision of disease sur-
veillance and treatment (30).
Ebola is now a great priority for global health security
(26, 31). The multiple challenges identified would require
a range of interventions to halt an epidemic. LMICs
are not coping with the current challenges of Ebola,
not only because they have poor and fragile systems, but
also because there are poor infectious surveillance and
response systems in place. That has had an impact due
to the poor epidemiological responses to emerging dis-
ease outbreaks, therefore community initiatives would be
important for disease prevention, surveillance, and com-
munity-based treatment and support (32). Evidence shows
that large-scale and coordinated efforts, both at national
and international levels, contribute to supporting both
affected and at-risk nations through developing response
systems and strengthening health capacities (26, 33).
Identification of potential cases is always problematic
in several LMICs, particularly with respect to contact
tracing and infection control, as well as prevention prior to
diagnosis. Several studies demonstrate that better disease
Krishna Regmi et al.
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surveillance, improved education, improved knowledge-
associated socio-ecological factors, and improved finan-
cial capacities would improve the local and national health
system in terms of control measures (28, 34). Borchert
et al. (35) claim that three important systems at the public
health levels  laboratory systems, information systems,
and networking and coordination systems  would be
able to detect and then respond to health threats. In
addition, developing some tools and approaches related
to diagnostics and novel therapies, including vaccines,
and implementing an early warning reporting system
(EWARS), would certainly contribute to health system
improvement (27).
Thus, poor health systems have significant impacts in
terms of their ability to strengthen disease surveillance,
patients’ care (and isolation), infection control, develop-
ing incident management systems, and disease test/screen-
ing. It is, therefore, important to improve EVD care and
support at both the individual and the systemic levels (31).
In addition, WHO’s capacity is important in playing a role
in the development of new essential vaccines (4).
The exact impact of EVD is still unknown, but it has
clearly left a great burden on health systems as well as
threatening the sustainability of health programmes, be-
sides which insecurity, civil strife, and political instability
might lead to displacement of populations (36, 37). Since
2014, Guinea has recorded a significant decline (over 31%)
in outpatient visits to hospitals due to the combination of
EVD with other diseases (38). Child health services were
affected the most, as the evidence reveals that cases of
diarrhoea and acute respiratory infection among under-5
children decreased significantly by about 60%, mainly due
to adverse effects [reduced hours, service closures, loss of
health workers (10% of the deaths) and service suspen-
sions] on service access and utilisation. Iyengar et al. (39)
argue that the outbreak has developed a profound risk
of escalating the mortality and morbidity of maternal
and newborn patients; for example, in Liberia, a 914%
reduction in antenatal visits, and the proportion of deli-
veries utilising the healthcare facilities has dropped by
933%, so it is important to prioritise maternal and new-
born survival issues in such humanitarian crises.
Strategic options
Hewlett et al. (40) argue that there must be an adequate
understanding of local people’s socio-political and eco-
nomic situations, as well as psychological insight into how
health service users, health practitioners, and the local
people may respond to a biological crisis to ensure that
response efforts bring appropriate strategies to minimise
such suffering (41). Similarly, appropriate measures to
protect healthcare professionals physically and emotion-
ally, and to train them to provide appropriate, safe clinical
care, are essential. In addition, providing education and
training support to healthcare professionals on disease
control and surveillance, and generating awareness of
veterinary public health (2) are necessary to reduce the risk
of contracting disease, as the vast majority of transmis-
sions of Ebola during an outbreak such as the current one
are person-to-person (25). Recent experiences have thrown
up a substantial research agenda. This would focus on
building up an Ebola isolation unit, strengthening disease
surveillance, and identifying and examining the source of
the outbreak, so as to introduce prevention and control
measures (42).
The WHO (43) representation of health systems en-
compasses both organisations and people, together with
their actions, directed towards meeting people’s healthcare
needs through design and delivery of responsive and finan-
cially fair systems. These thereby offer the best or most
efficient care using available human and material resources.
Ebola cannot be eradicated, but it can be managed. Robust
health systems  enhancing and strengthening capacity to
develop constant surveillance and outbreak verification
within the public health infrastructure  are an essential
step to the control and management of current and future
Ebola virus outbreaks (44).
As we have seen in relation to HIV/AIDS and cholera,
outbreaks place particular stress on those public health
systems that are least able to cope with them. Senior
managerial capacity is diminished as front-line staff are
infected. Additionally, the ability to undertake efficient
and effective supervision of district-level management and
front-line staff is compromised. These staff will themselves
be already facing extraordinary demands on their capacity
and capability to deal directly with the outbreak at the
local level. If management systems are already weak in
general, in the event of an Ebola outbreak they will be
stretched beyond their breaking point. While external
support will understandably be directed towards provid-
ing additional resource for the immediate management
of the outbreak, it is important that longer term support
is also provided to ensure that local health systems are
strengthened and better prepared for a future outbreak
or threat of an outbreak. In Antoun and Reich’s (45) view,
health systems should be reformed in such a way that
they seek to ‘improve performance, advance equity, and
resolve challenges’. In addition, bringing the system into
focus through a systems-thinking lens, that is, designing/
evaluating system-level interventions with system-wide
effects, assessing the main effects within the contextual
paradigms and involving multi-disciplinary and multiple
stakeholders, would help to understand the situations
better in terms of knowing not only what works, but what
works for whom under what circumstances (46).
Better systems thinking would make health systems-
strengthening investments and interventions effective, as
it would bring an opportunity for interaction between the
actors and components of the systems. Similarly, other
prevention measures are
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1. restriction of the movement of persons and goods
from epidemic-affected areas and coordination for
the effective combating of epidemic outbreaks in the
future (47);
2. engaging with key community members  decreas-
ing stigma, fear, and demoralising perceptions (48);
3. adopting a multi-disciplinary approach, including
case identification and management, infection con-
trol, and social mobilisation, as well as under-
standing of local contexts to develop and adapt
prevention messages and control measures (49); and
4. establishing intersectoral as well as trans-disciplin-
ary surveillance response systems through EWARS,
adequate collaboration, funding, participation from
wider stakeholders, research innovation for vaccine
development and pursuing global health initiatives
to establish surveillance systems with EWARS,
including researchaction interventions (27).
At the broader level, an holistic approach is clearly
needed, ‘understanding [. . .] the nature of public health
systems and the shifts from a medical paradigm to a more
holistic paradigm’ (50), encompassing human ecology, socio-
economic, political, environmental and policy agendas,
with appropriate division of responsibilities locally, na-
tionally, and globally through interdisciplinary collabora-
tion (2, 51). Kim-Farley (52) argues that ‘only through
worldwide concerted action will the effort to control infec-
tious disease be effective’. Additionally, trained/qualified
healthcare professionals with adequate supplies of per-
sonal protective equipment, and the development of stan-
dard operating procedures, are needed (33). It is equally
important to set up permanent testing/disease surveillance
facilities in under-served areas  the sort of places that
would be able to run a qRT-PCR block, ELISAs, and
rapid diagnostic tests at point of care (53), as well as
basic immunohistochemistry with enough generators and
technology to be able to store supplies. Third, community-
based strategies emphasising prevention, treatment, re-
sponse, and recovery are paramount. Building up health
infrastructure is the sensible long-term solution for man-
aging Ebola, and is a necessary response to the combina-
tion of rapid population growth and a decaying health
system in several African countries. In addition, positive
thinking towards Ebola patients/survivors, and exploring
appropriate community supports (education, counsell-
ing and psycho-social supports) are critical to minimise
potential anxiety, myths, and stigma (32).
Synthesising the strategic options outlined above would
suggest four broad domains within which specific pro-
blems are encountered. The first is the wider social and
economic context within which outbreaks of Ebola have
occurred. The second is the lack of vaccines and virus-
specific treatments. The third is the nexus of systemic
weaknesses in the healthcare delivery system. The fourth
is the absence of meaningful community engagement. Of
these four domains, the first may be the most important
for achieving long-term sustainable impact, but is the
domain least amenable to intervention during the course
of a particular episode. The second domain will be con-
sidered briefly below. However, it is the third and fourth
domains, which we see as being inextricably linked, which
offer the best prospects for medium-term intervention,
thereby strengthening the capability of the health system
to respond more effectively to any future outbreak.
Vaccines and therapies
Prior to the EVD outbreak in West Africa, progress in
developing effective vaccines and therapies had been slow,
in part due to the low numbers of cases associated with
EVD outbreaks. Since the recent outbreak, progress has
been accelerated and a number of therapies have been
tested in clinical trials; however, none to date have success-
fully demonstrated a significant therapeutic effect (27).
Additionally, as noted by Tully et al. (54), current treat-
ments are expensive, production can be difficult to scale
up, none are suitable for use prophylactically, and all
require supervision from already overstretched front-line
workers in overstretched Ebola treatment centres.
Perhaps more usefully, development of an effective
vaccine should offer long-term, preferably lifelong, pro-
tection for an individual as well as protection for un-
vaccinated individuals in the community through herd
immunity. To expedite the development of a suitable vaccine,
international consortia have been formed to accelerate
collaborative multisite trials of two candidate Ebola virus
vaccines: cAd3-EBOZ and rVSV-EBOV, while a third
vaccine, a combination prime-boost vaccination regimen
of Ad26- and MVA-EBOV entered a Phase I trial (54).
Crucially, ethical and regulatory approvals for these trials
were prioritised to reduce the time taken to initiate clinical
trials. Henao-Restrepo et al. (55) report on the interim
analysis of a trial of rVSV-ZEBOV in Guinea, West Africa.
The VSV-EBOV vaccine consists of a vesicular stomatitis
virus genetically engineered to express Ebola glycopro-
teins; and the vaccine variant known as rVSV-ZEBOV
specifically expresses glycoproteins of the Zaire Ebola
virus or ZEBOV. The trial, involving 7651 people, indi-
cated that rVSV-ZEBOV might be highly efficacious and
safe in preventing EVD, and is most likely effective at the
population level when delivered during an EVD outbreak
via a ring vaccination strategy  a similar strategy to
that used in the final stages of the smallpox eradication
campaign (56). However, a number of adverse events
were reported during the study and safety assessment is
ongoing. It is also unclear at this stage how a wide-scale
immunisation programme would be funded or imple-
mented within LMICs in the future.
Krishna Regmi et al.
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Health system strengthening
The literature identifies a number of discrete areas of sys-
temic weakness: training of healthcare professionals; poor
infection surveillance and response systems; infection
control; contact tracing; laboratory systems; information
systems; networking and coordination systems; and com-
munity ignorance and absence of community engagement.
A strategy of health systems strengthening would address
these through two closely connected strategic develop-
ments. The first would be the decentralisation of systemic
planning and management, and the second would be an
enhanced agenda of community engagement.
Decentralisation allows for more responsive decision-
making (57). This is particularly critical when a system
is in crisis mode. The most effective deployment of local
resources is a matter best determined closest to the point
of impact. Reassignment, or the co-option of ad hoc local
resources, should not be contingent on higher level author-
isation. Appropriate training programmes, designed in
accord with national and regional guidelines but tailored
to the local circumstance, will ensure that valuable knowl-
edge (both of disease-specific issues and of the operation
of general management and disease response systems) is
most effectively disseminated.
Decentralisation can strengthen the functioning of
routine systems. Even when these are developed in keeping
with quite stringent central requirements, decentralisation
encourages better feedback and generates a deeper under-
standing of their underlying purpose. Decentralisation
also frees the local healthcare system from log-jams that
may occur at higher levels of the system. The experience of
HIV/AIDS has taught us that one of the most debilitating
impacts of an outbreak is the absence of senior officers
at the higher levels of the system, which can lead to sys-
temic paralysis throughout the system.
Decentralisation and enhanced community engagement
go hand in hand. Recent experiences confirmed by the
available literature inform us that trust is a critical factor
in ensuring an effective community-level response. This
is itself predicated on a genuine two-way dialogue which
generates understanding  practitioner understanding of
community knowledge, beliefs and views, and commu-
nity understanding of the rationale for measures being
implemented (50). In the context within which there is a
strong motivation for family members to hide incidences,
community knowledge is vital. This will be provided when
community members feel that they can trust the response
that disclosure will initiate. Full community engagement
is also critical to the identification of ad hoc resources
that may be co-optable at the local level.
Conclusion
Health systems strengthening does not offer a panacea.
And health systems strengthening is most effective when it
is implemented as part of a longer term strategy of health
systems development. As countries move stutteringly into
remission, it is paramount that the recent experience, par-
ticularly the aspect of disease surveillance and monitoring
with community engagement, is thoroughly evaluated,
that longer term lessons are learnt, and that measures are
implemented that can lessen the impact of any future out-
breaks and (we would argue) can make the local health-
care system more effective in its more normal day-to-day
operation.
Conflict of interest and funding
The authors have not received any fundings or benefits
from industry or elsewhere to conduct this study.
References
1. Sobarzo A, Groseth A, Dolnik O, Becker S, Lutwama JJ,
Yavelsky V, et al. Detection of Sudan ebolavirus (strain Gulu)
epitopes that are targets of the humoral immune response in
survivors. Int J Infect Dis 2010; 14: e4612.
2. Kahn RE, Clouser DF, Richt JA. Emerging infections: a tribute
to the one medicine, one health concept. Zoonoses Public
Health 2009; 56: 40728.
3. Goel NK, Gurpreet, Swami HM. How to deal with emerging
and re-emerging infectious diseases globally? Internet J Bio
Anthropol 2006; 1: 1. Available from: http://ispub.com/IJBA/1/
1/6314 [cited 10 April 2015].
4. Dentico N. Ebola and the global governance of health. Recenti
Prog Med 2014; 105: 4056.
5. Rid A, Emanuel E. Ethical considerations of experimental
interventions in the Ebola outbreak. Lancet 2014; 384: 18969.
6. Petticrew M, Roberts H. Systematic reviews in the social
sciences: a practical guide. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing; 2006.
7. Institute of Medicine. Finding what works in healthcare:
standards for systematic review. Washington, DC: National
Academic Press; 2011.
8. Beeching NJ, Fenech M, Houlihan CF. Ebola virus disease.
BMJ 2014; 349: g7348. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.
g7348
9. Boardman A. Viral haemorrhagic fever. Prim Care Update Ob
Gyns 2004; 10: 816.
10. Liu WB, Li ZX, Du Y, Cao GW. Ebola virus disease: from
epidemiology to prophylaxis. Mil Med Res 2015; 2: 7. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s40779-015-0035-4
11. Van Kerkhove MD, Bento AI, Mills HL, Ferguson NM,
Donnelly CA. A review of epidemiological parameters from
Ebola outbreaks to inform early public health decision-making.
Sci Data 2015; 2: 150019. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/sdata.
2015.19
12. Dowell SF, Mukunu R, Ksiazek TG, Khan AS, Rollin PE,
Peters CJ. Transmission of Ebola hemorrhagic fever: a study of
risk factors in family members, Kikwit, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, 1995. Commission de Lutte contre les Epide´mies a`
Kikwit. J Infect Dis 1999; 179(Suppl 1): S8791.
13. Chan M. Ebola virus disease in West Africano early end to the
outbreak. N Engl J Med 2014; 371: 11835. doi: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1056/NEJMp1409859
14. Fletcher TE, Brooks TJ, Beeching NJ. Ebola and other viral
haemorrhagic fevers be prepared, with new guidance featuring
old and well established principles. BMJ 2014; 349: g5079.
15. Bausch DG, Sprecher AG, Jeffs B, Boumandouki P. Treat-
ment of Marburg and Ebola haemorrhagic fevers: a strategy
Strengthening health systems to control and prevent Ebola outbreak
Citation: Infection Ecology and Epidemiology 2015, 5: 28877 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/iee.v5.28877 5
(page number not for citation purpose)
for testing new drugs and vaccines under outbreak conditions.
Antiviral Res 2008; 78: 15061.
16. Feldmann H, Geisbert TW. Ebola haemorrhagic fever. Lancet
2011; 377: 84962.
17. Hewlett BL, Hewlett BS. Providing care and facing death:
nursing during Ebola outbreaks in central Africa. J Transcult
Nurs 2005; 16: 28997.
18. Bres P. The epidemic of Ebola haemorrhagic fever in Sudan and
Zaire, 1996: introductory notes. Bull World Health Organ 1978;
56: 245.
19. World Health Organization. WHO statement on the meeting
of the International Health Regulations Emergency Committee
regarding the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Geneva:
WHO; 2014. Available from: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/ [cited 7 October 2015].
20. WorldNetDaily. 1.2 million Ebola deaths projected in 6 months,
2014. Available from: http://www.wnd.com/2014/09/1-2-million-
ebola-deaths-projected-in-6-months/#wyHds09yz2ufE7Km.99
[cited 10 April 2015].
21. World Health Organization. Ebola Situation Report. Geneva:
WHO; 2015. Available from: http://apps.who.int/ebola/current-
situation/ebola-situation-report-16-september-2015 [cited 21
September 2015].
22. Ghazanfar H, Orooj F, Abdullah MA, Ghazanfar A. Ebola, the
killer virus. Infect Dis Poverty 2005; 4: 15.
23. World Health Organization. Neglected zoonotic diseases.
Geneva: WHO; 2015. Available from: http://www.who.int/
neglected_diseases/diseases/zoonoses/en/ [cited 6 October 2015].
24. Karesh WB, Dobson A, Lloyd-Smith JO, Lubroth J, Dixon
MA, Bennett M, et al. Ecology of zoonoses: natural and
unnatural histories. Lancet 2012; 380: 193645.
25. Souza MJ. One health: zoonoses in the exotic animal practice.
Vet Clin North Am Exot Anim Pract 2011; 14: 4216.
26. Shrivastava S, Shrivastava P, Ramasamy S. Ebola disease: an
international public health emergency. Asian Pacific J Trop Dis
2015; 5: 4.
27. Tambo E, Ugwu EC, Ngogang J. Need of surveillance response
systems to combat Ebola outbreaks and other emerging in-
fectious diseases in African countries. Infect Dis Poverty 2014;
3: 29.
28. Osungbade KO, Oni AA. Outbreaks-of Ebola virus disease
in the West African sub-region. Afr J Med Med Sci 2014; 43:
8797.
29. World Health Organization. Ebola virus disease. Geneva:
WHO; 2014.
30. Leditschke J, Rose T, Cordner S, Woodford N, Pollanen M.
The development of a protocol for post-mortem management
of Ebola virus disease in the setting of developed countries.
Forensic Sci Med Pathol 2015; 11: 2627.
31. Arwady MA, Bawo L, Hunter JC, Massaquoi M, Matanock A,
Dahn B, et al. Evolution of Ebola virus disease from exotic
infection to global health priority, Liberia, mid-2014. Emerg
Infect Dis 2015; 21: 57884.
32. Abramowitz SA, McLean KE, McKune SL, Bardosh KL,
Fallah M, Monger J, et al. Community-centered responses to
Ebola in urban Liberia: the view from below. PLoS Negl Trop
Dis 2015; 9: e0003706.
33. Pathmanathan I, O’Connor K, Adams M, Rao C, Kilmarx P,
Park B, et al. Rapid assessment of Ebola infection prevention
and control needs  six districts, Sierra Leone, October 2014.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2014; 63: 11724.
34. Mirkovic K, Thwing J, Diack PA, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention. Importation and containment of Ebola virus
disease  Senegal, AugustSeptember 2014. MMWR Morb
Mortal Wkly Rep 2014; 63: 9734.
35. Borchert J, Tappero J, Downing R, Shoemaker T, Behumbiize P,
Aceng J, et al. Rapidly building global health security capacity 
Uganda Demonstration Project, 2013. MMWR Morb Mortal
Wkly Rep 2014; 63: 736.
36. Stanturf JA, Goodrick SL, Warren ML, Jr., Charnley S,
Stegall CM. Social vulnerability and Ebola virus disease in
rural Liberia. PLoS One 2015; 10: e0137208.
37. Okeibunor JC, Ota MC, Akanmori BD, Gumede N, Shaba K,
Kouadio KI, et al. Polio eradication in the African region
on course despite public health emergencies. Vaccine 2015; doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.08.024
38. Barden-O’Fallon J, Barry MA, Brodish P, Hazerjian J.
Rapid assessment of Ebola-related implications for reproduc-
tive, maternal, new born and child health service delivery
and utilization in guinea. PLoS Curr 2015; doi: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1371/currents.outbreaks.0b0ba06009dd091bc39ddb3c6d
7b0826
39. Iyengar P, Kerber K, Howe CJ, Dahn B. Services for mothers
and newborns during the Ebola outbreak in Liberia: the need
for improvement in emergencies. PLoS Curr 2015; doi: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1371/currents.outbreaks.4ba318308719ac86fbef
91f8e56cb66f
40. Hewlett BS, Epelboin A, Hewlett BL, Formenty P. Medical
anthropology and Ebola in Congo: cultural models and
humanistic care. Bull Soc Pathol Exot 2005; 98: 2306.
41. Hall RC, Hall RC, Chapman MJ. The 1995 Kirwit Ebola
outbreak: lessons hospitals and physicians can apply to future
viral epidemics. Gen Hosp Psychiatry 2008; 30: 44652.
42. Bitekyerezo M, Kyobutungi C, Kizza R, Mugeni J, Munyarugero
E, Tirwomwe F, et al. The outbreak and control of Ebola viral
haemorrhagic fever in a Ugandan medical school. Trop Doct
2002; 32: 1015.
43. Krause PR. Interim results from a phase 3 Ebola vaccine study
in Guinea. Lancet 2015; 386: 8315.
44. Krech R, Kieny M. The 2014 Ebola outbreak: ethical use of
unregistered interventions. Bull World Health Organ 2014; 92:
622.
45. Antoun J, Reich M. Welcome to health systems & reform!.
Health Systems Reform 2015; 1: 1.
46. Savigny D, Adam T. Systems thinking for health systems
strengthening. Geneva: WHO; 2009.
47. Jalloh M. Analysing the economic consequences of an epidemic
outbreak: experience from the 2014. Ebola outbreak in West
Africa. J Nat Sci Res 2014; 4: 21.
48. Nyarko Y, Goldfrank L, Ogedegbe G, Soghoian S, de-Graft
Aikins A, NYU-UG-KBTH. Preparing for Ebola Virus Disease
in West African countries not yet affected: perspectives from
Ghanaian health professionals. Global Health 2015; 11: 7.
49. Barboza P. Response to international health crises: Marburg
haemorrhagic fever, Province of Uı´ge, Angola, 2005. Bull
E´pide´miol Hebd 2006; 7: 3369.
50. Thunhurst C. Public health systems analysis  where the River
Kabul meets the River Indus. Global Health 2013; 9: 39.
51. Simonsen L, Kane A, Lloyd J, Zaffran M, Kane M. Unsafe
injections in the developing world and transmission of blood
borne pathogens: a review. Bull World Health Organ 1999; 77:
789800.
52. Kim-Farley R. Principles of infectious disease control. In:
Detels R, Beaglehole R, Lansang M, Gulliford M, eds. Oxford
textbook of public health. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
2009, pp. 160222.
Krishna Regmi et al.
6
(page number not for citation purpose)
Citation: Infection Ecology and Epidemiology 2015, 5: 28877 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/iee.v5.28877
53. Bhadelia N. Rapid diagnostics for Ebola in emergency settings.
Lancet 2015; 386: 8335.
54. Tully CM, Lambe T, Gilbert SC, Hill AV. Emergency Ebola
response: a new approach to the rapid design and development
of vaccines against emerging diseases. Lancet Infect Dis 2015;
15: 3569.
55. Henao-Restrepo AM, Longini IM, Egger M, Dean NE,
Edmunds WJ, Camacho A, et al. Efficacy and effectiveness of
an rVSV-vectored vaccine expressing Ebola surface glycoprotein:
interim results from the Guinea ring vaccination cluster-
randomised trial. Lancet 2015; 386: 85766.
56. Krause PR. Interim results from a phase 3 Ebola vaccine study
in Guinea. Lancet 2015; 386: 8315.
57. Regmi K. Decentralising health services: a global perspective.
New York/Heidelberg/Dordrecht/London: Springer; 2014.
Strengthening health systems to control and prevent Ebola outbreak
Citation: Infection Ecology and Epidemiology 2015, 5: 28877 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/iee.v5.28877 7
(page number not for citation purpose)
